State as Evolving Phenomenon: Key Problems and Approaches

Estado como fenómeno en evolución: problemas clave y enfoques
Estado como Fenômeno em Evolução: Principais Problemas e Abordagens

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Abstract
The article analyzes the fundamental issues of state evolution and typology. The authors justify that the state is an evolving phenomenon of social and legal reality. At that, it is shown that in the process of this evolution, along with the preservation of universal (essential) characteristics, conditioned by the nature and social purpose of the state, there is a modification of those properties and attributes that have a specific historical character and depend on a variety of factors that influence a state on an appropriate stage of development. The paper substantiates that the evolution of a state phenomenon must be considered in the context of general social evolution, which is, in the most general sense, the process of that intersubjective experience complication, accumulation and organization. The authors argue that any common (generic) concept of "state" is a conditional one to a certain extent, since it does not have a real ontological status, acting as the result of a series of typifications mediated by language and carried out in accordance with the relevances largely dictated by that practical life situation.

Resumen
El artículo analiza los problemas fundamentales de la evolución del estado y la tipología. Los autores justifican que el estado es un fenómeno en evolución de la realidad social y legal. En eso, se muestra que, en el proceso de esta evolución, junto con la preservación de características universales (esenciales), condicionadas por la naturaleza y el propósito social del estado, hay una modificación de aquellas propiedades y atributos que tienen un carácter histórico específico y dependen de una variedad de factores que influyen en el estado de una etapa apropiada de desarrollo. El artículo corrobora que la evolución de un fenómeno de estado debe considerarse en el contexto de la evolución social general, que es, en el sentido más general, el proceso de esa experiencia intersubjetiva de complicación, acumulación y organización. Los autores argumentan que cualquier concepto común (genérico) de "estado" es, en cierta medida, condicional, ya que no tiene un estado ontológico real, que actúa como resultado de una serie de tipificaciones mediadas por el lenguaje y llevadas a cabo de conformidad con las repercusiones dictadas en gran medida por esa situación de vida práctica.

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Resumo

O artigo analisa os problemas fundamentais da evolução do estado e da tipologia. Os autores justificam que o estado é um fenômeno em evolução da realidade social e legal. Nisto, mostra-se que, no processo dessa evolução, juntamente com a preservação de características universais (essenciais), condicionadas pela natureza e finalidade social do Estado, há uma modificação daquelas propriedades e atributos que possuem um caráter específico. Eles dependem de uma variedade de fatores que influenciam um estado em um estágio apropriado de desenvolvimento. O artigo corrobora que a evolução de um fenômeno de estado deve ser considerada no contexto da evolução social geral, que é, no sentido mais geral, o processo dessa experiência intersubjetiva de complicação, acumulação e organização.

Os autores argumentam que qualquer conceito comum (genérico) "status" é, de certa forma condicional, porque não tem status ontológico real, que atua como um resultado de uma série de características mediadas pela linguagem e realizadas de acordo com as repercussões ditadas em grande parte por aquela situação de vida prática.

Introduction

Evolution is an inalienable and the most important characteristic of statehood from the time it emerged to our days; nevertheless, the problem of the state historical development has appeared in the field of view of historians and social scientists relatively recently, namely, one and a half centuries ago. This circumstance is far from being an accidental and characterizes the spiritual climate of the modern era.

The period of modernity was the time of revolutionary changes in the social life of the first Western peoples, and then of the rest of humanity. Social transformations of an unprecedented scale and intensity, which began in the 16th-17th centuries, reached their apogee during the bourgeois revolutions, which led to a radical transformation of social relation system in the countries of Western Europe and North America. The result of these transformations is an almost universal withdrawal from the historical scene of traditional, or pre-industrial, societies and the coming of the industrial (modern) type of societies instead of them. During the era of the New Time the state finally separated from society, having become a relatively isolated social institution with its own organization that does not reproduce any other social structures, an independent social purpose, and the principles of functioning (Spiridonov, L.I., 2001).

At the same time, a modern state, being a product of the rationalistic consciousness and the mechanistic cultural paradigm of the New Age epoch, was a well-established mechanism from the very beginning. It is worth noting that the idea of a state machine has become widespread not only in the West, but also in those countries of the East, to which Western culture exerted a particularly intensive influence (for example, in Egypt during the reign of Muhammad Ali). In general, if we turn to the analysis of the socio-political and legal processes that accompanied the emergence of a modern state in various regions of the world during the 18th and 19th centuries, we can easily see that the main stimulus, the driving force behind these processes, was the formation and an active borrowing of rationalist models and ideas about the state, which had a significant impact not only on the western, but also on the eastern political and legal culture (Villalobos Antúnez, 2016).

Thus, in particular, the attempts of state reforms undertaken in the Ottoman Empire throughout the entire 19th century, especially during the period known as the "Tanzimat era" (1839-1876) were dictated by rationalistic motivations. The most important legal acts of Tanzimat were executed with rationalistic ideas, especially the Sultan's manifestos of 1839 and 1856 (Hutt-i shifir and Hatt-i Humayun), as well as the Constitution of the Ottoman Empire of 1877, the style and content of which were very unusual and did not correspond to traditional Islamic ideas. The ideas of the inspirers of the famous "One Hundred Days of Reforms", conducted by Kang Yuwei and his supporters in China in 1898
were equally rational.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the scientific thought of the late XIXth - early XXth century was filled with the desire to see the focus of rationality in a modern state, the result of the creative activity of the human intellect (Ward L. F. 1883) or even some kind of a rational being. In any case, there is no doubt that a modern state in all its institutional manifestations is a historically determined phenomenon that, at the time of its appearance on the public prosenium, was the most expedient and rational response to those objective regulatory requirements that arose in specific social conditions for New Time (Kabasheva et al, 2017).

**Historical background and the strategy for the study of state phenomenon evolution**

The modern type of state is perceived traditionally as an absolute entity, which entails the confusion of state and modern state concepts. At the same time, the issue of the state evolution, its historical dynamics in this context, was not raised at all. Even M. Weber, who more than others did for the study of the historical dynamics of statehood, saw a famous standard in a modern rational bureaucratic state, an archetype of statehood as such (Weber M., 1930). Meanwhile, the study of any state of antiquity and the Middle Ages, that is, a traditional state in our terminology, makes us rethink to some extent the ideas existing in science about the attributes that are necessary for a state as such. In a traditional state, such signs (territory, the rule of public political power, legal nature, the existence of a state organization, etc.) manifest themselves differently than in a modern state, which, in our opinion, is conditioned by the historical dynamics of statehood.

All mentioned above is shown in an extremely graphic way by the example of an ancient polis state, which is still being discussed, whether it is a city-state or just a civil community that does not have any signs of statehood. Given some features of the policy, individual historians in general questioned the existence of statehood in the ancient civil society (Will E., 1972, Berent M., 2000). The supporters of this point of view referred, among other things, to the absence of a clear boundary between public and private law relations in a polis, thus, as Osborne wrote, "the polis embraced politai in all their various manifestations" (Osborne R., 1985). At the same time, researchers have repeatedly expressed the idea that the policy has all the characteristics inherent in a modern state. This position is most consistently defended by M.Kh. Hansen, who believes that the polis in general does not differ significantly from a modern state, or rather, from its ideal theoretical model developed in the writings of modern thinkers (Hansen M.H., 1998). A similar opinion is shared by I.E. Surikov, who sees, for example, sovereignty, as one of the most important characteristics of the polis state of the archaic and classical periods.

Many scholars, however, believe that the notion of sovereignty in general is not applicable to the ancient policy, as, indeed, to any other traditional state. In fact, in legal theory, as is known, it is customary to distinguish between internal (supremacy) and external (the independence of state power) aspects of sovereignty. And both external and internal aspects of it are connected with the territorial sign of a state one way or another. It is obvious, however, that the territorial feature had, for example, less importance for an ancient polis state than for a modern state, as was already noted by ancient authors (in particular, Herodotus and Thucydid). It is not accidental, for example, that no polis state had its own toponymic name, but simply referred to as "the people of a certain city" (in particular, the Athenian state is always called hoi Athenaioi, that is, the "Athenians") (Manville Ph. B., 1990).

It should be noted that the ancient Eastern state was relatively unrelated to its territory. This was manifested most of all in the so-called civil-temple community, in which historians see an analogue of an ancient polis. Thus, the Jewish diasporas, deprived of own "territorial" state in the Vth cent. BC., were crystallized in the form of such communities, which became the form of statehood preservation until the second century BC., when there was the revival of the Jewish state (Guthrie H., 1960). However, this example is far from an isolated one. In this respect the "posthumous" destinies of the Assyrian, Hittite and a number of other ancient Eastern states are indicative. The well-known and rather noteworthy facts are the attempts of the surviving heirs of these empires to revive them after the fall of political centers on the periphery (and even beyond) of the territory once occupied by the deceased state.

At the same time, even with this, the states of the Ancient World paid relatively little attention to a clear fixation of their borders (and thus the establishment of the spatial limits for their...
territory), determining them only when they come into contact with the neighbors equal to or superior to them in strength. One of the earliest (and most textbook) examples of this kind was the peace treaty concluded in 1296 or 1270 BC. between the Egyptian pharaoh Ramses II and the Hittite king Hattusilis III which summed up the long struggle of Egypt and Hatti for Syria and Palestine. At that, the attention is paid to following fact in the text of the treaty, the record of which was made on the walls of a number of Egyptian temples: actually, one can hardly speak about territorial claims and territorial delimitation of two states.

The Hittite version of the text only refers to the intention of Hatti ruler to follow the provisions of the "attested (?) Treaty, who was the king of the Hittites at the time of Seperer (Supililium), and an equally attested treaty who was the ruler of the Hittites at the time of Mechenra (Muvatallah)," (Anthology, 1960), in the Egyptian variant, more attention was paid to the borders between states. But in the agreement, the fate of the subjects of both rulers who were hiding in the territory of another warring state and subject to extradition after the conclusion of peace between them was determined meticulously, so it seems that the position of these defectors was no less interesting (if not more) by the contracting parties than the resolution of territorial claims.

This circumstance was noted by G. Jellinek, according to whom "the significance of the territorial element of the state in antiquity was not recognized" (Jellinek G., 2004). This thesis was recognized later in the writings of some historians who believed that such important signs of a modern state as the population and the territory received a rather peculiar embodiment in many traditional states that consisted (like the feudal state of Western Europe in the 11th-14th centuries) "of people and lands." This peculiarity of the territorial feature of the traditional state, the absence of a rigid binding to a strictly defined location, gave rise to very curious historical phenomena of so-called "nomadic states" from time to time, first explored by historians on the example of some ancient polis, and also nomadic empires that existed among a number of peoples of Eurasia at a certain stage of their historical development. A similar ability to move in space, according to L.S. Vasiliev, was also inherent to the cities-principalities of medieval Russia.

All that has been said, in our opinion, indicates that other criteria, including sovereignty and the state apparatus, as applied to the states of the Ancient World, the Middle Ages, and also to the early New Times partially, should also be treated with considerable reservations, considering the historical specifics of these states. Proceeding from this, some foreign researchers tend to conclude that not only the signs of the state in their modern manifestation, but also the state is historically relative as a social and a legal phenomenon, arising at very late stages of social evolution. Identifying the state as such with the state of a modern type, they concluded that the state is a specific product of Western civilization, finally formed in the era of modern times. This concept was actively developed in political anthropology, whose efforts were aimed at "Eurocentric prejudices" disclosure in the perception of the phenomena and the institutions of the modern world (including the state) in order to discover their civilizational foundations.

As a result, political scientists devoted a considerable attention to the evolutionary processes that led to the emergence of the state, trying to determine the place occupied by the latter in the evolutionary row of social and political institutions, and there was no unanimous opinion on this issue (Razuvaev N.V., 2011). Thus, according to the well-known classical concept by E. Servis and M. Salins, the political communities consistently go through four stages in their development, namely a local band, a tribe, a chieftain and a state (Sahlin M.D, 1960, Service E.R., 1971). On the other hand, E. Evans-Pritchard, whose ideas had a significant influence on the views of Service-Salins, distinguished five stages of political evolution, which seem to have universal, general historical significance: akefal communities, chiefdoms, city-states (nomas, policies), empires and states (Fortes M., Evans-Pritchard E.E., 1940; Lyubashits et al, 2017).

As you know, these, and similar schemes were later subjected to vigorous and largely unfounded criticism (Llewellen T.C., 1983). In particular, their one-line character was noted, unable to reflect the complexity of the evolutionary process adequately, which is (as in other spheres of society) multidirectional one and involving numerous branches and dead ends. In addition, criticism has caused the authors' desire to reduce the variety of factors that determine the evolution by any one or several permanent reasons (for example, to political complexity increase and the diversification of society political organization). Nevertheless, the very idea of the
fundamental identity of the state as such and the state of the modern type continues to enjoy the support of some political scientists, political anthropologists and historians.

The position by M. Van Creveld is very characteristic in this respect, according to which: "A state, ... like a corporation, which is a particular case of a state, is a relatively recent invention. For most of the history, and especially during the prehistoric period, there were governments, but not states" (Van Creveld M., 2016). Summarizing his research in this area, the author comes to the conclusion that a state as a special political organization arises in Western Europe not earlier than in 1300 and receives its final design in the period between the death of the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Charles V (1558) and the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia (1648)” (Van Creveld M., 2016). This conclusion is based on the research of a number of historians, who also stressed the ethnological character of statehood which distinguished a state in this respect as a nation from empires that are universal (supranational) in nature and therefore which are not states (Eisenstadt S.N., 1963).

Main part

The very word "state" appeared, at least in European languages, relatively late, not earlier than in the 16th-17th centuries. At that, in classical languages, the words that are usually translated as "state" (Greek πόλις, Latin civitas, res publica) in no way designate a state as an institution, they should rather be translated as a "community", "the unification of people", i.e., a community that acts as a collective. It is no accident that in English the analogue of civitas and res publica is not state, but a commonwealth, as evidenced, for example, by unambiguous instructions in the writings by T. Hobbes and J. Locke (Skinner Q., 2002).

The specifics of the ancient understanding of the state have relatively recently become the subject of research by L. L. Kofanov, who drew attention to the polysemy of the meaning of the term res publica, which, in his opinion, can simultaneously be used to designate both a state and a state property (Kofanov L.L., 2006). Referring to the famous definition of Cicero (Cic. De republ. I, 35, 39) res publica (est) res populi, L.L. Kofanov notes that: "Under the word "res" Cicero meant not only the state structure, the laws, the authorities of the Roman people, but also its property, public property" (Kofanov L.L., 2006). Thus, there is, roughly speaking, a private legal nature of the term "res publica" interpretation in Roman law and legal thought, perceived from Cicero, who introduced the corresponding term into circulation (Mancuso G., 1995).

As for the European counterparts, the word "state" (Fr. - état, German - Staat, English - state, Italian - lo stato, Spanish - edad), they all do not go back to res publica, but to lat. status, originally denoting a legal status of a person and having a private legal significance (it is no accident in the Roman legal sources where this word is used, it was not applied to public entities sometimes, but to individuals only). Only in the XIIIth century, within the conditions of estate and class representation development, the word status begins to acquire a new meaning, namely, "estate" and at the same time "occupation", since only an inherent kind of activity was assigned to each estate in hierarchical medieval society. In such a picture of the world there was no place not only for the state in the modern sense, but even for the idea of its necessity.

That is why, for a long time after its appearance, the word status was used to refer not a state as a public legal entity, but as private-law corporations, and this word denoted the corporations of representatives, usually with noble professions (doctors, lawyers, university professors, etc.). The latter circumstance gave grounds to Gaines Post to put forward, at first glance, quite an unexpected, but, on the whole, very plausible hypothesis about the origin of the term "state" (status). In his opinion, initially this term was used to designate one of such corporations, which for some reason was transformed into a political organization that has supremacy over private (professional and also other ones) associations (Post G., 1964). Perhaps this first occurred in France at the beginning of the fourteenth century, when King Philip IV, preparing to convene the General States (1302), in opposition to the feudal nobility, who opposed the involvement of representatives of the so-called "third class" ( tiers état) to the solution of state affairs", brought the university professors of law to himself, who formed his personal administration.

It seems to us that the reason for the lexical shifts discussed above is to be seen in the evolution of the idea of the state that accompanies the historical dynamics of the state itself and which is its indicator. Such a dynamics in the countries of
Western Europe was due to a number of socio-cultural, economic and political changes and included many processes that took place at the micro level. One of the factors that influenced the evolution of the West European state in the Middle Ages and the era of the early New Time is, as we know, the complication of the social structure of society. So, if in the XI-XII centuries there were only three ordines - aratores, bellatores and laudatores, i.e., the peasantry, the knights and the clergy, then in the thirteenth century about twenty-eight etats were determined. In Old European languages, the word "etat" was also originally originally identical to the Latin "status", but at the same time it was radically different from ordines. As J. Le Goff notes, this word is still missing in the "Book of Manners," written by Etienne de Fouger in about 1175, it appears only at the beginning of the thirteenth century, marking certain shifts not only in the social structure, but also in the very world outlook of medieval society (Le Goff J., 1964).

However, the meaning of the term under consideration is not exhausted by the mentioned at all. It is noteworthy that in the medium-high German "stat" can also mean a land plot or other property. In this sense the word "stat" is used in the Saxon Mirror (13th century), where it is thus placed on a par with such words as "gut" and "lant". Similarly, the Roman legal sources used the Latin word "territorium", which could denote both the land belonging to an urban community, "municipia", and an administrative district, and, finally, the land plot that is privately owned by a person. The Polish word "panstwo", the Bulgarian and also the Russian "state" are close to this latter meaning. In other words, the meaning of private domination was originally embedded in the notion of state in the Slavic languages (perhaps, under the influence of the Byzantine μπέστ, which was loaned into the Old Slavonic language, and into other Slavic languages through it).

In addition, it should be noted that in Russian language the word "state" appeared rather late (Ingerflom C., 1993) and has been used for a long time exclusively in the meaning of "a country under the control of a sovereign", at least in this way it is defined in the dictionary by V.I. Dahl. In the "Dictionary of the Russian Language" by S.I. Ozhegov two meanings of the word state stand out: 1) a political organization of a class society and 2) a country with such an organization. As for the word sovereign (a nobleman), from which the word state derived, then, ascending to the word "the Lord" (*hosti-potes), expresses in itself the idea of property domination inherent also to this latter, including land ownership, and also people living on it. The same meaning this word has in almost all Slavic languages (compare Bul. "gospodar", Serbo-Croatian "gospodar", Slovenian "gospodar", Czech "hospodar", Polish "gospodarz", etc.), and, as A. Zoltan points out, "a sovereign is a Slavic only in the sense of "a master, an owner," and not as the title of a head of state" (Zoltan A., 2002).

All mentioned above testifies to the existence of a qualitative historical originality that distinguishes the traditional states of the Ancient World and the Middle Ages from the states of the modern type, which makes it impossible to fully compare traditional and modern states. At the same time, one can not agree with those researchers who connect the phenomenon of the state exclusively with the epoch of the New Age, qualitatively contrasting this phenomenon with the political formations that existed in traditional society. It seems that with all the weight and persuasiveness of the arguments cited in support of this point of view, this is hampered, not least, by purely logical considerations.

In fact, considering a state only as the final link in the evolutionary chain of phenomena, one can not but conclude that this is logically a species concept (along with chiefdoms, polices, empires, etc.). However, species concepts, possessing a number of specific properties inherent in them, at the same time have, as we know, something common, in fact, and ensuring the existence of logical relations between them. Otherwise, there would be no reason to believe that the relevant concepts are connected with each other, and not with any other categories.

Thus, the related species refer to the presence of a more general generic category, including them in its scope, thus giving to these species a formal-logical certainty that determines, among other things, their semantic difference from the species of a different genus. Such an interpretation of the genus-species relationships is already present in its embryonic form in Aristotle's "Classes," then obtaining its explicit expression in the comments of Porphyry and especially of Boethius, to who determined the classical definitions of "genus" and "species" (Boethius, 1996). Aristotle's theory also goes back to the idea that genus, in contrast to
species, is deprived of real being, being only an abstract "general characteristic," which unites a multitude of phenomena that have an independent logical meaning and ontological content. According to Stagirite, "the species is more of an essence than the genus, it is closer to the primary essence. In fact, if somebody begins to define the primary entity, [indicating] what it is, he will determine it clearer (more accurately) and closer by the indication of species rather than by the indication of genus" (Aristotle, 1935).

All these considerations, as we know, had a really great impact on the further development of the philosophical, and through it, the scientific discourse. Having abandoned the realistic (in the medieval meaning of the term) interpretation of the categories of genus and species as having an independent being, which already in the days of Rosselin and Abelard gave rise to so many justified objections, modern science nevertheless did not go away from the once posed problem of the reality of general, including abstract ones, concepts and their correlation with specific phenomena in all the fullness of the individual characteristics of the latter.

As to the subject in this study, this problem will look like this: first, can the term "state" be used to refer to not just one of the historically sequenced evolutionary phenomena, namely, as their common designation, that is, as a generic category? And, secondly, does this abstract-generic "state in general" have all the universal attributes that are inherent in this or that cognitive value in the theoretical plan, or should the specific types of states and the specific characteristics that are inherent in them be the subject of theoretical knowledge?

Proceeding from what has been said before, it seems that it is possible to give a positive answer to the first question. In fact, highlighting a number of evolutionarily interrelated phenomena and recognizing the very fact of their interconnectedness within the framework of the historical process, we thereby establish the commonality of these phenomena, allowing them to be viewed as different types of the same object of cognition, the self-identity of which manifests itself only at the highest level of theoretical generalization. In this sense, the category of the state as a generic term represents a certain universe, or a limited area of specific meanings (Schweitzer H., 1935). Moreover, these values, likened to each other in any one respect (most often corresponding to the goal and tasks faced by a researcher and the methodological methods used by him), need not have the identity in all other aspects necessarily.

It would, however, be a mistake, in our opinion, to speak of the real existence of the "state as such" in its universally general sense, trying to discern a certain "phenomenon of social reality" in it, existing as an accessible one to the empirical perception of the object along with other objects of the surrounding world. This kind of approach faces a number of serious difficulties that it is unable to overcome. In particular, the scientists who adhere to a naively realistic attitude in the perception of the state often fail to explain how an abstract (generic) concept that the state must possess at all stages of its evolution agrees with the variety of specific historical manifestations of statehood, often having more differences than similarities among themselves.

In other words, the reality of the state as a cultural universal is a special kind of reality, it is a product of the community member activities aimed at the organization, the construction of a common social reality based on a multitude of data of intersubjective experience. In this sense, the state is no different from other social entities (such, for example, as legal entities), whose reality in the unproblematic natural setting of the vital world is denied most often. The nature of such universals gets its fullest and most profound explanation in the context of phenomenological social philosophy, elaborated in due time by A. Schütz who saw the result of typifications in them performed via various (primarily sign-symbolic) means. At that, the totality of such types is based on a system of intersubjectively relevant relevances, that is, the criteria in accordance with which the heterogeneous elements of experience are generalized and the social reality and its various phenomena (in particular, the state) are developed on their basis (Schutz A., 1970).

In fact, any, including a single object, even if they assume the possibility of such existence in isolation from the set of phenomena associated with it by various kinds of relations in reality, this is already the result of a typing procedure application designed to bring together its multiple manifestations in an individual or a social experience of individuals. This sort of typification, the generalization of a multitude of diverse, often contradictory data of social experience, organized in accordance with the chosen criteria (relevances), is not only the state as a general category and not only all the specific historical varieties of the state. The result of
typification is also every single state with which society members encounter in their daily lives. It is no accident that M. Weber saw in the state as an empirical object only "an infinite number of diffuse and discrete actions and passive reactions, actually and legally ordered links, either individual in character or regularly recurring ones" (Weber, M., 1930).

Consequently, the cognition of reality in general (and theoretical cognition as well) is nothing more than one of the ways of its organization and ordering, which is carried out using the typologies on the basis of a system of relevances chosen for various tasks. This system of relevances (and their corresponding types) has a multi-stage, hierarchical character that corresponds to the hierarchical structure of an organized reality itself. Moreover, each next stage of typing specifies and clears the typing of a higher level, which is more "abstract" in the sense that the latter includes a greater number of single values in its volume, setting the horizons of possible problematizations for all subsequent levels of cognition. This is how the movement from genus to species, from species to subspecies, classes and any other more particular typifications takes place, a movement quite comparable to "the ascension from an abstract to a specific," which is the content of scientific knowledge in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition.

Hence the answer to the second of the questions posed above. Abstract and concrete, generic and species concepts not only in the epistemological sense (as the typifications of different degrees of generality) are interrelated and mutually suggest each other as the necessary components of intersubjective activity aimed at the organization of social reality. Being a kind of sedimentations of the historically accumulated social experience (and, consequently, knowledge as a reflexive refraction of the data from this experience), they can also be viewed ontologically as interrelated phenomena primarily in the context of the evolution problem which is of interest to us.

Although a detailed consideration of this problem as such is not included in the tasks of this study, it seems possible to define it in the most general terms as the process of complication, accumulation and organization of that intersubjective experience, the elements of which form the matter of social (and also legal) reality in all its manifestations, including the state. This complication of the experience that occurs in the process of evolution makes the already existing typing inadequate, prompting them to be refined in the typologies of the following levels, forming all new levels of reality, respectively, called to fix its changes, that is, dynamics. At the same time, universal categories (generic categories, using the Aristotelian-Boetian terminology), created via the typing of the highest order, perform an important backbone function in its turn, since they fix the statics of social reality, as well as its various segments.

A biological systematics can be an excellent illustration of this, describing the evolution of living nature and containing, as you know, eight hierarchically coordinated taxonomic ranks (domain - kingdom - type - class - order - family - genus - species). Each of them is a series of typifications, concretizing the preceding, higher and logically more abstract rank by describing the changes that occur with it in the process of evolution. However, neither the changes themselves nor the differences caused by them abolish the membership of certain taxa (which, by the way, are very far apart from each other on the evolutionary tree) to one common rank, and this common rank does not deny and dispute the differences that taxa acquire in the course of their evolution.

It seems that the situation is similar in some respects to those categories in which social reality and its evolution are described. So, with the reference to our subject, we can distinguish the following levels of typification, differing from each other by the degree of abstraction from the features of the empirical material and reflecting the successive stages of movement from the abstract to the concrete in the process of a state phenomenon development. These levels are the following ones: 1) a state as a universal (world-historical) phenomenon, which has a number of features that remain unchanged at all stages of its evolution and express the essential characteristics of statehood in itself; 2) the historical types of a state, formed by typing homogeneous relationships that are formed in all societies which are at the same stage of historical development; 3) the subtypes of a state (for example, western or eastern traditional states), typifying the relations that form in groups of societies which are at a certain stage of evolution, and therefore not only inherent in states of one evolutionary type, but also characterizing their local (regional) identity; 4) the types of state (for example, noma, eastern despotism, policies, empires, etc.), typifying the relations inherent in groups of states of the same historical subtype.
with common formal legal and political characteristics; 5) specific states (in particular, Russian Federation) that typify relations which are formed in a particular society at one or another stage of its historical development.

Conclusions

Thus, any common (generic) concept, and the state is not an exception here. On the one hand, it is conditional one to a certain extent, since it does not have a real ontological status, acting as the result of a series of typifications mediated by language and carried out in accordance with the relevances, in many respects dictated by that practical life situation in which (and in whose interests) the perception of the world around us takes place. On the other hand, this circumstance does not make the generic categories less "real" than the species concepts they cover, or even single facts that fall under these concepts and categories. At that, the more this or that typification general, the more the number of the phenomena it covers differing from each other. It is obvious that these phenomena have their specific characteristics, which (as long as they are the characteristics of phenomena, so to speak, belonging to the same genus) should be regarded as historical modifications of these common (generic) concepts and attributes. The latter, being the basis of all concrete-historical types of statehood, manifest themselves differently in each of them, so that one can talk only within the conceptual level about their unchanged availability in any state. Nevertheless, in our opinion, the study of the state evolution (and, consequently, of those changes that occur during this evolution) should begin with the consideration of these universal concepts and attributes, not forgetting their historical and formal-logical content.

References